posted May 13, 2008 03:08 PM            

Many social scientists had long rejected the possibility that humans
might harbor unconscious attitudes different from their conscious
behavior. But, in trying to explain the persistence of racial
prejudice, political psychologists were forced to hypothesize
different levels of awareness and motivation. On the highest level was
public moral reflection guided by social norms--which led to Trent
Lott being pilloried when he famously said in 2002 that, if Dixiecrat
Strom Thurmond had been elected president, the country could have
avoided "all these problems." Beneath this, however, was a realm of
knee-jerk opinion that might contradict a person's moral reflections;
and still beneath that were unconscious attitudes, which, like a
person's knee-jerk opinions, were often at odds with his or her public
moral reflections. If racial prejudice persisted, it was on these
deeper levels.

Political psychologists devised new tests to uncover these sentiments.
First, they crafted survey questions aimed at unearthing what they
called "symbolic racism," "modern racism," and, most recently, "racial
resentments," which ascribe to blacks as a group certain negative
attributes or undeserved advantages. For example, researchers asked
respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with statements such as
"It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks
would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites" or
"Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than
they deserve."

Experimenters then inserted questions like these into the American
National Election Studies (ANES), extensive biennial surveys funded by
the National Science Foundation. The answers revealed a degree of
racial resentment that wasn't apparent from more explicit questions
about racial bias. In 1986, for instance, 59 percent of respondents
agreed that blacks were not trying hard enough (only 27 percent
disagreed), while 67 percent thought blacks should work "their way up
... without any special favors." Psychologists David Sears and Donald
Kinder, as well as others, found that this racial resentment was the
single most important factor--more important than even conservative
ideology or political partisanship--in explaining strong opposition to
a host of government programs that either directly or indirectly
benefited minorities. Of course, that doesn't mean there couldn't be
principled conservative opposition to government-guaranteed equal
employment or urban aid. But, according to the political
psychologists, racial resentment played the largest role in fueling
public skepticism.

The answers also revealed which groups within society continued to
harbor racial resentment. With the help of Harvard doctoral student
Scott Winship, I looked at the levels of racial resentment in ANES
data from 1988, 1992, and 2000 (the questions were omitted in 1996).
What Winship and I found was that resentment was highest among males
rather than females, the middle class rather than the wealthy or poor,
those lacking a college degree, those who worked in skilled or
semi-skilled blue collar jobs or as laborers, and residents of small
towns in the Midwest and South. Does that profile sound familiar? It's
more or less a description of the white working-class voters who have
spurned Obama and with whom John Kerry and Al Gore had trouble. The
only groups that didn't evince racial animosity toward blacks were
voters with post-graduate degrees and, of course, African Americans.
Hispanics were nearly as prejudiced as whites, and a group labeled
"other" that includes Asian Americans was even more so--a partial
explanation, perhaps, for why Obama fared so poorly among these groups
in California. Clearly, racial resentment persisted--just in a more
nuanced form.

This is very interesting too:

Obama's connection with the Reverend Jeremiah Wright, which exploded
into the news after the Ohio primary, may do lasting damage to his
candidacy by undermining his attempt to transcend race. Wright's words
tie Obama to the stereotype of the angry, hostile--and also
unpatriotic--black who is seen as hating both whites and white
America. Wright turns Obama into a "black candidate" like Jackson or
Sharpton. And, as a black candidate, Obama falls prey to a set of
stereotypes about black politicians.
Barack Obama

Some of these have to do with abilities. A 1995 study found that
voters believe black politicians "lack competence on major issues."
Other stereotypes relate to ideology. Several studies have shown that
if subjects compare a black and white candidate with roughly equal
political positions, they will nevertheless see the black candidate as
more liberal. Obama is already vulnerable to charges of inexperience,
and, after Wright surfaced, he fell prey to an ideological stereotype
as well. Whereas he benefited in the initial primaries and caucuses
from being seen as middleof-the-road or even conservative, his
strongest support has recently come from more liberal voters. In
Pennsylvania, he defeated Clinton among voters who classified
themselves as "very liberal" by 55 to 45 percent, but he lost
"somewhat conservative" voters by 53 to 47 percent and moderates by 60
to 40 percent. In a national Pew poll, Obama's support among "very
liberal" voters jumped seven points between January and May, while his
support among "moderates" dropped by two points. Since Obama's actual
policies are, on the whole, no more liberal than Clinton's (his health
care plan, for instance, is inarguably more conservative), these
trends strongly suggest that some voters are stereotyping him because
of his race.

If Obama wins the Democratic nomination, he should be able to inherit
the white women who backed Hillary Clinton. As political psychologists
have shown, these voters should be largely amenable to his candidacy.
He should also continue to enjoy an advantage among white
professionals. But Obama is likely to continue having trouble with
white working-class voters in the Midwest--voters who tend to score
high on racial resentment and implicit association tests and who,
arguably, decided the 2004 election with their votes in Ohio. Obama
will also have trouble with Latinos and Asians, groups that score high
on both indexes, and that can be important in states like California.
It's not hard to quantify Obama's problem: If 9 to 12 percent of
Democratic primary voters in swing states have been reluctant to
support him because he is black, one can assume that, in the general
election, 15 to 20 percent of Democrats or Democratic-leaning
Independents may not support him for the same reason.